The article follows Kant's different views on aesthetics ranging from the pre-critical period to the Critique of the Power of Judgement. It argues that John Zammito's psychological explanation of why Kant in the third Critique developed an argument for the transcendental justification of judgements of taste is unconvincing. As an alternative, the article shows how Kant in his published pre-critical discussions of aesthetics was relying upon empiricist sources while he in private comments turned to consider the culture critique of Rousseau. Kant's preoccupation with questions of culture critique, it is argued, was an important reason to enlarge the doctrines of transcendental philosophy with a third Critique containing a transcendental aesthetics of beauty. Additionally, it is pointed out an interesting similarity throughout the development of Kant's philosophy. In 1765 and in the third Critique Kant was concerned to keep philosophy and judgements of taste apart from science in order to argue that these were spaces for freethinking.
son, and elevating its rules to a science." Rather, aesthetics should be understood in its original Greek meaning as a term designating the human ability to obtain sensory impressions. Kant proclaimed a system of transcendental philosophy in which the term aesthetics was confined to the "transcendental Aesthetics," a transcendental aesthetics that amounted to a transcendental demonstration of the pure forms of intuition, space and time. Hence, introducing the system of transcendental philosophy Kant denied all attempts to connect aesthetics as judgements of taste with any principles of reason. He rejected Baumgarten's endeavour as "futile" and stressed how the "putative rules or criteria [of taste] … are merely empirical as far as their sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as determinate laws a priori according to which our judgement of taste must be directed, rather the latter constitutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness of the former." 2 Transcendental aesthetics understood as the pure forms of intuition, space and time, Kant argued, made up an important element of the field of science and was exempted from any connection to judgements of taste. As merely empirical the judgements of taste stood outside the realm of principles of reason.
In his pre-critical philosophy Kant also thought of judgements of taste as empirical. In the 1760's he deemed all judgements of beauty to be based upon feeling and therefore thoroughly empirical. Kant furthermore supposed judgements of taste to be analogous to moral judgements. Both were based upon feelings and thus of empirical nature. In the small book Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime from 1764 Kant explored the associative interconnections between feelings of beauty and the sublime with moral feelings. The book was one of his most popular pre-critical books republished twice in 1766 and 1771. Kant's point of departure was an anthropological and empirical generalization of the human being which led him to discuss feelings of beauty and the sublime as not only analogous to moral feelings but also to the nature of the human sexes. Accordingly, the feeling of beauty was generally related to the female sex and the moral feeling of helpfulness, that is "the inclination to kindness." 3 The feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, was most often associated with the male sex and the feeling of true virtue based upon principles.
These principles, Kant went on to explain, "are not speculative rules, but rather the consciousness of a feeling that lives in all human breasts … the feeling of the beauty and dignity of the human nature." 4 Though the sublime and the feeling of virtue were related to a kind of principle this should not be understood as if they were based upon independent principles of reason. Rather, all judgements of taste and morals were reducible to natural feelings.
In the first Critique Kant completely reversed any such positive assessment of the empirical nature of judgements of taste and morals. Transcendental moral philosophy should be grounded on a principle of reason and, as we have seen, Kant scorned the attempt to develop a philosophical aesthetics for its empirical basis. However, this was not his final conclusion. As Kant nine years later, in 1790, published the Critique of the Power of Judgement it contained a complete revision of his view on judgements of taste.
Kant only retained one element from his rather rejecting view in the first Critique, namely that there can be no science concerned with aesthetic judgements of taste. Nevertheless, Kant claimed the pure judgement of taste included a principle a priori. As such they should be considered part of the transcendental system of philosophy -that is a part of the principles of reason. The special variety of the principles a priori in judgements of taste Kant called a "subjective universal validity, that is the aesthetic, which is not based upon any concept." 5 Judgements of beauty escaped the empirical realm albeit in the paradoxical form of having subjective universal validity. 
THE ELEGANT MAGISTER OF THE 1760'S
In the 1760's Kant was known in Königsberg for his distinguished style in manners as well as clothing. Friends and students approvingly called him the elegant magister (der galante Magister) because of his stylishness. Just as important for his reputation was the fact that Kant introduced the intellectual circles of Königsberg to the new philosophical trends from Britain and France. Kant was described as a man of elegance who impressed the social life of Königsberg with his intelligence, wit and tasteful habits. Concerned with his outer appearance he was said to have developed the maxim that it "was better to be a stylish jester than a jester with no sense of style." 6 As a man in his late thirties and early forties he would wear extravagant clothes such as jackets with gold embroidery and a ceremonial epee.
This extravagance was only possible because Kant was an esteemed as well as hard working private lecturer (Privatdozent). It was usual that a private lecturer at the university would be teaching between 16 and 24 hours each week. 7 Earning his living from the fees payed by the students attending his lectures, Kant -as all private lecturers -would advertise for his teaching hoping his reputation combined with the exciting content of the courses could attract many paying students to his classes. Kant's teaching advertisement for the winter semester 1765 has survived to our times. Here we can read that Kant keenly underlined that he was not teaching "philosophy" but trying to convey to the students how to "philosophise." Kant's title most strikingly alludes to these two well-known British philosophical essays.
According to Hutcheson the beautiful object contains objective qualities, which the individual is exposed to. Thus, if there is disagreement about beauty it mainly has to do with just how beautiful a thing is, not with whether or not it is beautiful at all. 10 In order to argue for the objective quality of all beautiful objects Hutcheson assumes that beauty is perceived by "an internal sense [which] is a passive power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity amidst variety." 11 Burke does not follow Hutcheson in his perfectionist comprehension of the objective qualities of beauty nor the assumption of a specific sense to perceive beauty. Rather, he argues that judgements of taste are developed and improved "by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by a frequent exercise." 12 According to Burke judgements of beauty advance through experience of beautiful objects and are based upon empirical sense experience. Even more obviously Kant echoes Burke's explanation of the sublime as a negative experience of the great, which is turned into a feeling of pleasure by the subject. According to Kant the feelings of beauty and the sublime both cause pleasant but very different emotions. Kant explicates the difference by pointing out that "the sublime stirs and the beautiful allures." 13 This difference Kant, also in accordance with Burke, 14 observes to derive from the objects: "The sublime must always be great, the beautiful can also be small. The sublime must be simple, the beautiful can be pol- 
THE PURE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE AND FREE BEAUTY
According to Kant the pure judgements of taste concern free beauty. But often our judgements relate to dependent beauty that simply stirs or allures us. The difference between the aesthetic judgements relating to social esteem and the pure aesthetic judgements concerned with the reflective power of judgement and the feeling of intellectual pleasure is also associated to the object of the aesthetic judgement. Free beauty does not presuppose any concept whereas dependent beauty is deemed beautiful conditional to the perfection of the object and thus conditional to the concept of perfection of the object.For example a rose is beautiful regardless of its organic perfection as a flower that enables the plant to set seeds and thus reproduce itself. But a chandelier is beautiful dependent upon its perfection and grace as a chandelier. The differentiation concerns the way the mind is affected by the aesthetic object. In defining free beauty, Kant is not referring to the properties of the object but rather to how the human mind responds to the object. The mind commences to wander as the imagination is undecided with regard to what concept can capture the experience of beauty in the object. This is not the case with dependent beautywe can explain why a chandelier is an especially beautiful chandelier with reference to the definition of chandeliers. The beauty of a rose is not dependent upon it being a rose or even a flower. It is free from all conceptual definition of its "floweriness." As a result, the mind wanders. It does not accept the proposed concepts of the understanding as adequate encapsulations of the aesthetic experience.
The experience of free beauty expands the capacities of the mind whereas the experience of dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens) lingers on the allurement of emotions in the subject. In the experience of free beauty, the imagination and the understanding are animated in the free play, which Kant considers to be correlated to the transcendental feeling of pleasure.
ART AND BEAUTY
Objects of art are, Kant emphasises, objects produced with a purpose by a human being. As such art can either be mechanical or aesthetic. 31 All art created for the purpose of realising the cognition of how to produce the thing is mechanical. The chandelier is mechanical art because the silversmith formed the silver with the purpose of creating a chandelier. The silversmith had as her purpose to realise the thought idea of a thing, which can function as a container supporting burning candles. Aesthetic, on the other hand, is all art, which has the feeling of pleasure as its immediate purpose.
This implies that it is not possible to point out what was the exact purpose of the creative process. There can be many ways to accomplish the purpose of arousing a feeling of pleasure and art can either be agreeable or beautiful. The agreeable art stimulates the observer's feelings of sensational pleasure. In beautiful art, the representations of the object convoy feelings of cognitive pleasure in the observer. The feeling of pleasure originates from the free play between the imagination and the understanding produced in the observer contemplating the artwork.
By way of this definition of aesthetic art Kant indicates a double character. Either art can be a medium staging human fashion and social stratification or it can be a vehicle for expansion of the communication and intellectual comprehension of art itself and its purpose. Clearly Kant thinks art can be beautiful in a similar manner as the free natural beauty if it is aesthetically beautiful. At the same time, he underlines that not all aesthetic art functions analogously with natural beauty. If it is aesthetically agreeable art it is not comparable to natural beauty. It is evident with regard to beauty in art, just as is the case with natural beauty, that the attitude of the observer and the quality of the object make up the deciding aspects as we judge some artwork or object of nature to be beautiful.
The important difference between the object of nature and of art is that we cannot point to a purposeful creator of nature but must always expect a purposeful creator of art. This gives nature its simplicity and art its complex social meaning.
The aesthetic ideas make up the aesthetic medium in which the production of beautiful artworks can take place. 32 This implies that the subject having an aesthetic experience of a beautiful artwork is aware of the object as art and thus aware of the purposeful creation of the object. But the judgements of taste cannot exhaust the object. Kant explains that "by an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible." 33 There is no definite interpretation ready at hand.
Artworks without a powerful aesthetic idea can be exhausted as their aesthetic value is created by allurement (Reiz) and thus depends upon being agreeable. Artworks with strong aesthetic ideas overflow with a manifold of images and concepts so that no expression can be found which would encompass the whole of the experience of the work. The free play of the mind strives to find adequate descriptions. Whenever a concept is proposed in communication about the artwork it only opens up for even more un-thought of and un-named concepts and parts of the work. In the judgement of beautiful art, we request others to see and experience the same as us. Thereby our conversation about the artwork is a conversation, which expands our concepts by way of the wandering imaginationit wanders not only in the sensational experience or the conceptual knowledge but also in our personal life experience and our hopes and fears of the future. The observer of art should meet an artwork with traits that will be universally assented to if the artwork is to be judged beautiful. If art is merely or primarily a distraction its main service will be to satisfy the subject's relentless craving after ever new distractions in order to expel the ensuing discontentment of the unstirred mind. 36 The aesthetic stance towards life can therefore -as Kant had learned from Rousseau -be a distraction from living a morally justified life in accordance to valid values. But if art and the judgements of taste are related to the higher purpose of "an ever-progressive culture," Kant believes art can be a gateway to important discussions about fundamental values and perspective on our common living. The transcendental judgement of taste points to the enhancement of our common communication about how to lead our lives. Therefore, a standard of beautiful art is that it should be "brought into more or less close combination with moral Ideas…" 37 Important for art as beautiful and not merely "full of spirit" is the The space in which we apply judgement of taste to beautiful art has central traits in common with Kant's pre-critical description of teaching philosophy. In 1765, Kant highlighted the want of a well-established discipline of scientific philosophy and the consequence, namely that it is not possible to teach philosophy as a science with a clear body of scientific results for the students to memorise. The primary aim of the teacher of philosophy should therefore be to teach students "to philosophise." 39 Students should be taught how "to think about things yourself and to judge for To learn to philosophise -according to Kant in 1765 -amounted to learning to think and judge for one self. In the third Critique Kant designates this ability to the judgements of taste. Underlying the pure judgements of taste is the faculty of the sensus communis.
THE ABILITY TO THINK FOR ONESELF
It includes "a faculty of judgement, which in its reflection takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of all other men in thought; in order as it were to compare its judgement with the collective reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising from the private conditions that could so easily be taken for objective." 41 The important common trait between Kant understanding in 1765 and in 1790 is the underscoring of the importance of human free thinking. In the maxims of the sensus communis Kant underlines this as he states that the human understanding is based on the maxims "1. to think for oneself" and "3. always to think consistently." The second maxim, "2. to put ourselves in thought in the place of every one else" points to a social limitation to the free thinking and is an advancement compared to Kant's understanding of how to philosophise in 1765. In the third Critique Kant emphasises how the free thinking of each of us needs to be directed to the equal free thinking of any other in order to develop harmonically. 
